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JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
Jurisdiction is conferred on this Court pursuant to Utah 
Code Ann. §77-35-26(2)(a) (1953 as amended) and Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2a-3(2)(f) (1953 as amended), whereby a defendant in a district 
court criminal action may take an appeal to the Court of Appeals from 
a final judgment and conviction for any crime other than a first 
degree or capital felony. In this case, the Honorable James S. 
Sawaya, Judge, Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake 
County, State of Utah, rendered final judgment and conviction against 
Mr. Hulse for Theft, a third degree felony. 
iii 
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES 
1. Was the evidence presented at trial insufficient to 
support that Mr. Hulse committed the theft of either of the two 
watches as alleged by the State, and did the trial court erroneously 
deny the motion for a new trial requested by Mr. Hulse? 
IV 
TEXT OF STATUTORY CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(5) provides: 
Separate offenses arising out of single criminal 
episode—Included offenses.— 
(5) If the district court on motion after verdict or 
judgment, or an appellate court on appeal or certiorari, 
shall determine that there is unsufficient evidence to 
support a conviction for the offense charged but that 
there is sufficient evidence to support a conviction for 
an included offense and the trier of fact necessarily 
found every fact required for conviction of that included 
offense, the verdict or judgment of conviction may be set 
aside or reversed and a judgment of conviction entered for 
the included offense, without necessity of a new trial, if 
such relief is sought by the defendant. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 provides: 
Theft—Elements.—A person commits theft if he obtains or 
exercises unauthorized control over the property of 
another with a purpose to deprive him thereof. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412 provides in pertinent part: 
Theft—Classification of offenses—Action for treble 
damages against receiver of stolen property.—(1) Theft 
of property and services as provided in this chapter shall 
be punishable as follows: 
(b) As a felony of the third degree if: 
(i) The value of the property or services is 
more than $250 but not more than $1,000; or 
(ii) The actor has been twice before convicted 
of theft of property or services valued at $250 or 
less; or 
(iii) When the property taken is a stallion, 
mare, colt, gelding, cow, heifer, steer, ox, bull, 
calf, sheep, goat, mule, jack, jenny, swine, or 
poultry. 
v 
(c) As a class A misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was more than $100 but does not exceed 
$250. 
(d) As a class B misdemeanor if the value of the 
property stolen was $100 or less. 
vi 
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF UTAH 
THE STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff/Respondent, 
v. 
ROBERT RAY HULSE, 
Defendant/Appellant. 
Case No. 880579-CA 
Priority No. 2 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a judgment and conviction for 
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-404 (1953 as amended), following a jury trial and subsequent 
motion for a new trial held July 28, 1988 and September 23, 1988, 
respectively, in the Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt 
Lake County, State of Utah, the Honorable James S.Sawaya, Judge, 
presiding. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
On May 20, 1988, Appellant, Robert Ray Hulse, entered The 
Time Shop Jewelers, a jewelry and watch retail sales store, at 15 
West South Temple in Salt Lake City (T. 41-43). Mr. Hulse had been 
in the store the day before and had looked at a black analog digital 
Seiko watch. He liked it and promised to return after his payday at 
a later date (T. 45). Between 12:00 noon and 3:00 p.m., Mr. Hulse 
returned to The Time Shop Jewelers and spoke again with salesman 
Jeffrey Hansen (T. 48). Mr. Hulse asked to see the watch he had 
looked at the day prior as well as a second watch (T. 48-49). 
Mr. Hansen removed them from the wall display and placed them on the 
counter in front of Mr. Hulse (T. 49). Mr. Hulse took the black 
watch out of the case and tried it out—placing it on his wrist 
(T. 51). 
Mr. Hansen testified that Mr. Hulse then picked up the 
second watch, turned around 360 degrees, and quickly left the store 
(T. 51-52, 63). Mr. Hansen jumped over the counter and chased 
Mr. Hulse outside to his parked car (T. 52). When Mr. Hansen jumped 
over the showcase counter, creating a loud noise, the attention of 
others in the store was attracted to Mr. Hansen (T. 75, 84). 
Mr. John Logsdon, salesman, followed Mr. Hansen outside to see what 
was wrong (T. 75-76). Mr. Howard Logsdon, owner of The Time Shop 
Jewelers, was working in the second story balcony area; he heard the 
loud noise and saw Mr. Hansen running out the door (T. 84). He did 
not observe the immediate occurrences outside. 
Upon leaving the store, Mr. Hulse ran to his car and 
prepared to drive off (T. 64). However, Mr. Hansen jumped into the 
car through the open passenger window and grabbed Mr. Hulse in an 
effort to restrain him and prevent him from driving away (T. 52). 
Mr. Hansen ended up in the back seat of the car holding Mr. Hulse 
from behind (T. 53). Mr. John Logsdon joined them in the car to 
help restrain Mr. Hulse (T. 65, 75). Mr. Hulse managed to start the 
car and drive off despite the two men struggling with him (T. 75-76). 
Mr. John Logsdon then managed to move the gearshift from 
drive into park at about the same time the car ran into the granite 
_ ? 
pillar at the street corner (T. 53, 66, 76). At this juncture, two 
pedestrians responded to Mr. John Logsdon's pleas for help and 
together the four of them restrained Mr. Hulse until police arrived 
(T. 55). 
Police arrested Mr. Hulse and placed him in a paramedics 
unit so that they could treat the several lacerations Mr. Hulse had 
received (T. 55, 95, 97). Lieutenant Norm Thompson of the Salt Lake 
City Police Department then removed a watch from the wrist of 
Mr. Hulse, who was very agitated, vocal and loud and who protested 
that the watch was his (T. 95-97). The watch was given to Detective 
B. L. Smith, who testified that he placed it into the police 
evidence room later that day (T. 98-100). 
Mr. Hansen testified at trial that he was sure Mr. Hulse 
took two watches (T. 68). He identified Exhibit 1 as the watch 
Mr. Hulse had placed on his wrist but admitted on cross-examination 
that he had no way of knowing whether Exhibit 1 was the exact same 
watch (T. 55, 57). Mr. Howard Logsdon testified at trial that he 
recognized Exhibit 1 because he owns a grey one just like it; he 
stated the store always tries to keep one in stock and did so on 
May 20, 1988 (T. 86). 
Detective Smith testified that he picked up Exhibit 1 
that morning from police evidence and brought it to court 
(T. 99-100). He stated he picked it up in the same envelope in 
which he had placed it on May 20, 1988; he did not, however, know 
the identification number (T. 100). Mr. Hulse objected to admitting 
Exhibit 1 because "it had not been identified as the same watch that 
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was placed in evidence through any means other than saying it 
appears to be the same watch" (T. 100). The objection was overruled 
and the watch was admitted into evidence (T. 100). The value of 
Exhibit 1 was established to be $220.00 (T. 51, 90). 
Exhibit 5 was recognized by Mr. Hansen as the second 
watch taken by Mr. Hulse because he testified that Mr. John Logsdon 
picked it up from inside the car after the crash (T. 62). He 
testified that it was damaged in the crash and that Mr. John Logsdon 
then took it inside the store and sat it on the safe until the day 
of trial (T. 62). Mr. John Logsdon testified that after the crash, 
he saw the watch on the floor of the car, picked it up and placed it 
in his pocket (T. 77). He forgot about it until two and one-half 
hours later when he recalled it was in his pocket; he then placed it 
on top of the safe in The Time Shop Jewelers until the day of trial 
(T. 77-78). Exhibit 5 was admitted into evidence without objection 
by Mr. Hulse (T. 80). The value of Exhibit 5 was established to be 
between $180.00 and $185.00 (T. 51, 90). 
Following the State's case in chief, Mr. Hulse moved for 
a directed verdict and for the court to reverse its ruling on the 
admissibility of Exhibit 1 inasmuch as no one was able to identify 
the watch but only could state it looked like the watch 
(T. 106-07). The trial court denied the motions (T. 107). The 
defense then rested (T. 108). 
The trial court instructed the jurors and the case was 
ultimately submitted to them for deliberations (T. 108). The jury 
returned with a verdict of guilty (T. 129). 
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After the guilty verdict but before actual sentencing, 
Mr. Hulse moved for a new trial on the basis of newly discovered 
evidence (T. 133). Mr. Hulse proffered that new testimony would 
establish that Exhibit 5 had not been found in the car but rather 
from the street and that such testimony would impeach the trial 
testimony of prosecution witnesses (R. 69-70; T. 133). The trial 
court denied the motion and sentenced Mr. Hulse to a term not to 
exceed five years at the Utah State Prison (T. 134, 137). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
The evidence presented at trial was insufficient to 
support that Mr. Hulse committed a theft of two watches from The 
Time Shop Jewelers retail store. 
The black watch, Exhibit 1, was not positively identified 
by any of the State's witnesses. The other watch, Exhibit 5, was 
unsupported by the facts to have been stolen by Mr. Hulse; further, 
a motion for a new trial based on new evidence about Exhibit 5 was 
erroneously denied. 
A finding of insufficiency of evidence regarding either 




POINT I. THE EVIDENCE ADDUCED AT TRIAL WAS 
INSUFFICIENT TO SUSTAIN A CONVICTION AGAINST 
MR. HULSE FOR THIRD DEGREE FELONY THEFT. 
The standard employed for reviewing the sufficiency of 
evidence and reversing a jury verdict is well established. In 
State v. Petree, 659 P.2d 443, 444 (Utah 1983), the Utah Supreme 
Court stated, "[N]ot withstanding the presumptions in favor of the 
jury's decision, this court still has the right to review the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support the verdict." Further, the 
Court noted: 
We reverse a jury conviction for insufficient 
evidence only when the evidence is sufficiently 
inconclusive or inherently improbable that 
reasonable minds must have entertained a 
reasonable doubt that the defendant committed the 
crime for which he was convicted. 
Id. This Court has adopted this very same standard for reviewing 
cases for sufficiency of the evidence. State v. Garcia, 744 P.2d 
1029, 1030 (Utah App. 1987). This standard restates the due process 
requirement which prohibits a criminal conviction in any case except 
upon proof beyond a reasonable doubt of every fact necessary to 
constitute the crime with which the defendant is charged. 
Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307 (1979); In re Winship, 397 U.S. 
358 (1970); State v. Sorenson, 758 P.2d 466 (Utah App. 1988). 
Mr. Hulse was charged by Information with the crime of 
Theft, a third degree felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-404 (1953 as amended) based on the probable cause statement 
- fi 
that claimed (1) Mr. Hulse tried on one watch, was holding another, 
and then bolted from the store without paying for either watch; and 
(2) the total value of the two watches, later found on Mr. Hulse, 
was $495.00 (R. 13-14). 
The crime of Theft is statutorily defined as follows: 
Theft-Elements.—A person commits theft if he 
obtains or exercises unauthorized control over the 
property of another with a purpose to deprive him 
thereon. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-404 (1953 as amended). Utah Code Ann. 
§76-6-412(1)(b)(i) classifies a theft of over $250.00 but not more 
than $1,000.00 as a third degree felony. That same statute, at 
subsections (c) and (d), classifies a theft of $250.00 or less or 
$100.00 or less as a Class A or Class B misdemeanor respectively. 
Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(c-d) (1953 as amended). 
Accordingly, to support the conviction of a third degree 
felony, it is requisite that the State must have proven beyond a 
reasonable doubt that Mr. Hulse exercised unauthorized control of 
the two watches which together valued over $250.00. Otherwise, the 
conviction is unsupportable and must be reversed. 
A. EXHIBIT 1, THE BLACK ANALOG DIGITAL SEIKO WATCH 
At trial, Mr. Hulse objected to the admissibility of 
Exhibit 1 claiming that no one had been able to positively identify 
the watch as the one which had been taken from The Time Shop 
Jewelers (T. 100). The trial court admitted the exhibit over that 
objection (T. 100). After the State rested, Mr. Hulse moved for a 
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directed verdict and further requested that the Court consider the 
admissibility of Exhibit 1 and exclude the same inasmuch as no 
positive identification had been made by witnesses (T. 106-07). 
Again the Court rejected Mr. Hulse's claims and allowed the exhibit 
to reach the jury (T. 107). 
Mr. Hulse now asserts that the State failed to carry its 
burden of proof and claims that insufficient evidence existed for 
the jurors to conclude that he had stolen Exhibit 1 from The Time 
Shop Jewelers. Four individuals were asked by the State whether 
Exhibit 1 was the watch taken by Mr. Hulse; none of them were able 
to state that it was in fact the watch. Mr. Jeff Hansen testified 
on cross-examination that there was no way of knowing that Exhibit 1 
was the exact same watch (T. 47). 
Mr. Howard Logsdon, owner of The Time Shop Jewelers, 
stated on direct examination that Exhibit 1 "would just have to be 
the same" because it is the only analog digital that is all black 
(T. 88). Yet, on cross-examination, his certainty was discounted 
when he conceded that the reason he could say for sure that the 
watch was his was because he had one in stock and then after the 
fracas [the alleged theft], he no longer did (T. 91). He further 
disclosed that the model in question was a very popular watch 
(T. 91). 
Lieutenant Norm Thompson testified that he forcefully 
removed a black watch from the wrist of Mr. Hulse on May 20, 1988 
(T. 95-96). After initially identifying Exhibit 1 as the watch in 
question, he admitted that it could be a different watch 
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(T. 96-97). His most positive statement was that "it appears to be 
exactly the same watch" (T. 97) (emphasis added). 
Detective Bruce Smith, as the other three before him, was 
unable to make a positive identification. After offering that the 
serial number of the watch should be logged, he disclosed that he 
did not know what that number was (T. 99-100). 
Mr. Hulse objected to the watch being admitted as 
evidence inasmuch as no identification greater than it appears to be 
the watch was offered by the State (T. 100). That objection was 
overruled and the watch admitted into evidence (T. 100). 
Mr. Hulse asserts that the inability of State witnesses 
to identify the watch as the watch which was taken from the store 
demonstrates the State failed to establish its case. He insists 
that without a positive identification of the watch, reasonable 
minds must have entertained a reasonable doubt that he committed the 
crime. State v. Petree, 659 P.2d at 444; State v. Harman, Slip 
opinion, No. 870290-CA (Utah App. January 10, 1989). 
B. EXHIBIT 5—THE OTHER WATCH AND THE MOTION FOR 
A NEW TRIAL 
Mr. Hansen testified that Mr. Hulse left the store with 
two watches, the black analog digital on his wrist and a second 
watch, Exhibit 5, in his hand (T. 51-52, 68). No one corroborated 
the testimony that Mr. Hulse had a second watch in his hand. 
The only other incriminating testimony was that of 
Mr. John Longsdon, who testified that after the car crash, he found 
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Exhibit 5 on the floor of the car and that he picked it up and put 
it in his pocket (T. 77). He stated that he then forgot about the 
watch but, over two hours later, recalled it was in his pocket; he 
then removed it and placed it on the safe in The Time Shop Jewelers 
store (T. 77-78). Mr. John Logsdon testified the watch remained 
there until the day of the trial when he brought it to court and 
gave it to the prosecutor (T. 77-78). 
Contrary to the charge in the Information, the second 
watch was not found on the person of Mr. Hulse (R. 13-14; T. 77). 
Moreover, subsequent to the conviction of Mr. Hulse on this charge, 
he moved the trial court for a new trial based on the discovery of 
new evidence directly bearing on this watch (T. 133; R. 69-70). 
Specifically, Mr. Hulse proffered that new testimony would establish 
that Exhibit 5 had not been found in the car but rather in the 
street (T. 133; R. 69-70). The trial court denied the motion for a 
new trial (T. 134) . 
Mr. Hulse asserts that decision was erroneous and an 
abuse of the Court's discretion. State v. Williams, 712 P.2d 220, 
222 (Utah 1985). He further contends the newly proffered evidence 
was significant because it contradicted the testimony regarding 
where the store's salesman claimed to have found the watch. 
Mr. Hulse further asserts that independent of the newly 
discovered evidence, but supported thereby, the evidence of his 
guilt regarding the second watch was unsatisfactorily proven by the 
State and that reasonable minds must have entertained a reasonable 
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doubt that he had stolen the second watch. State v. Petree, 659 
P.2d at 444. 
C. VALUE OF THE TWO WATCHES 
Mr. Hulse urges that this Court reverse his conviction 
because insufficient evidence existed to support the theft of either 
watch. He further contends that in the event this Court finds 
insufficient evidence only as to Exhibit 1, or alternatively just 
Exhibit 5f this Court still must reverse the conviction of the third 
degree felony inasmuch as the value of either watch alone is 
insufficient to support that conviction. 
A conviction for a third degree felony theft requires a 
demonstration that the value of the item(s) stolen was over $250.00 
but not more than $1,000.00. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1)(b)(i) 
(1953 as amended). If the item is over $100.00 but not more than 
$250.00, the proper classification of the crime is a Class A 
misdemeanor. Utah Code Ann. §76-6-412(1)(c) (1953 as amended). 
In this case, Exhibit 1 was properly valued by the owner 
of The Time Shop Jewelers at $220.00, and Exhibit 5 was valued at 
$180.00 (T. 89-90). Therefore, if this Court finds the evidence 
insufficient to support the theft of either watch, while upholding 
the theft of the remaining watch, the value at issue would be below 
$250.00 and insufficient to support a conviction of a third degree 
felony theft. 
The Court could possibly, however, under these 
circumstances, sustain a conviction supported by just one watch or 
- 11 -
the other as a Class A misdemeanor. See State v. Bolsinger, 699 
P.2d 1214, 1221 (Utah 1985); Utah Code Ann. §76-1-402(5) (1953 as 
amended). 
CONCLUSION 
For all or any of the foregoing reasons, Mr. Hulse 
requests this Court to reverse the conviction of the third degree 
felony Theft and order that the charge against him be dismissed, or 
alternatively that either a Class A misdemeanor conviction be 
imposed against him or a new trial ordered.;/ 
Respectfully submitted this ^^O day of February, 1989. 
1 "4 
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